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11 
Informed Consent as Compelled Professional Speech: 
Fictions, Facts, and Open Questions 
Nadia N. Sawicki* 
Until recently, First Amendment jurisprudence was not considered 
particularly relevant to the context of physician-patient 
communication. As explained by First Amendment Scholar Robert 
Post, physicians regularly face liability on the basis of what they say 
or fail to say, “[w]ithout so much as a nod to the First Amendment 
. . . .”1 
In the past few years, however, legislative efforts to define the 
contours of informed consent in the provision of abortion services 
have brought increased attention to the First Amendment’s role in 
medical practice. Many states have enacted statutes requiring 
physicians to provide women seeking abortions with specific 
information beyond the bounds of what would be required under 
common law—that having an abortion increases the risk of breast 
cancer, infertility, and suicide;
2
 that medical abortion may be 
 
 * Associate Professor, Loyola University Chicago School of Law, Beazley Institute for 
Health Law and Policy. An early draft of this article was presented at the American Society for 
Law, Medicine, and Ethics’ June 2015 Health Law Professors Conference, as part of a panel 
thoughtfully coordinated by Elizabeth Sepper. Many thanks to colleagues who offered feedback 
and suggestions on earlier drafts, including Claudia Haupt, Jessie Hill, Helen Norton, and 
Robert Post. My thanks also go out to the invaluable research assistance of Loyola Law student 
Xavier Vergara. 
 1. Robert Post, Informed Consent to Abortion: A First Amendment Analysis of 
Compelled Physician Speech, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 939, 950 (2007). 
 2. See State Policies in Brief: Counseling and Waiting Periods for Abortion, 
GUTTMACHER INST. (July 1, 2015), https://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_ 
MWPA.pdf (citing laws requiring disclosure of links between abortion and breast cancer, 
infertility, and psychological harm); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-23A-10.1(1)(e)(ii) (2015) 
(requiring disclosure of “[i]ncreased risk of suicide ideation and suicide”), upheld by Planned 
Parenthood of Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds, 530 F.3d 724 (8th Cir. 2008). Many researchers 
dispute the validity of these required disclosures. See Nadia N. Sawicki, The Abortion Informed 
Consent Debate: More Light, Less Heat, 21 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 12–13 (2011). 
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reversed;
3
 that a fetus is a unique human being with whom the 
woman enjoys a constitutionally protected relationship;
4
 and visual 
descriptions of the fetus as displayed on an ultrasound.
5
 Beyond the 
abortion context, new laws regulating physician speech on topics 
such as gun ownership,
6
 sexual orientation change efforts,
7
 medical 
marijuana,
8
 and physician aid-in-dying
9
 raise similar questions about 
the constitutional limits of state control over physician-patient 
communication. These laws call attention to the fact that physicians 
frequently engage in significant communicative activities.
10
 
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has provided only limited 
guidance on the intersection between physician speech and the First 
 
 3. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-2153(A)(2)(h)-(i) (2015); ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-16-
1703(b)(1)(G) (2015). Most doctors agree that the science behind the abortion-reversal claim is 
erroneous. See Rick Rojas, Arizona Orders Doctors to Say Abortions With Drugs May Be 
Reversible, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1, 2015, at A11 (quoting the chairwoman of the Arizona section 
of the American Congress of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, who described the claim that 
medical abortion can be reversed as having “no data behind it, absolutely no science to show 
that this is an effective method”).  
 4. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-23A-10.1(1)(b); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.1-02 (2015); 
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-6709(b)(5), 65-6710 (2015). 
 5. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.35.2(D)(2)(b) (2008) (amended 2013); N.C. GEN. 
STAT. § 90-21.85(a) (2011), held unconstitutional by Stuart v. Camnitz, 774 F.3d 238 (4th Cir. 
2014); OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 1-738.3d(B) (2010), held unconstitutional by Nova Health Sys. v. 
Pruitt, 292 P.3d 28 (Okla. 2012); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 171.012(a)(4) (West 
2011), preliminary injunction vacated by Tex. Med. Provs. Performing Abortion Servs. v. 
Lakey, 667 F.3d 570 (5th Cir. 2012). 
 6. Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Fla., 797 F.3d 859 (11th Cir. 2015) (upholding Florida 
law banning doctors from inquiring about patients’ gun ownership). 
 7. Pickup v. Brown, 740 F.3d 1208, 1236 (9th Cir. 2014) (upholding California ban on 
conversion therapy for children, applying rational basis review); King v. Governor of N.J., 767 
F.3d 216 (3d Cir. 2014) (upholding New Jersey ban on conversion therapy as a regulation of 
professional speech that passes intermediate scrutiny). See also H.B. 2307, 78th Leg. Assemb., 
Reg. Sess. (Or. 2015); D.C. CODE §§ 7:1231.01-15 (2015) (prohibiting mental health 
professionals from engaging in sexual orientation change efforts with minors); and 405 ILL. 
COMP. STAT. ANN. 48/30 (2016) (same). 
 8. Conant v. Walters, 309 F.3d 629 (9th Cir. 2002) (enjoining the federal government 
from revoking a physician’s license on the basis of the physician’s recommendation of medical 
marijuana; applying strict scrutiny). 
 9. Final Exit Network, Inc. v. State, 722 S.E.2d 722 (Ga. 2012) (holding GA. CODE ANN. 
§ 16-5-5(b) (1994) to be an unconstitutional restriction of speech, applying strict scrutiny); State 
v. Melchert-Dinkel, 844 N.W.2d 13 (Minn. 2014) (holding the State could prosecute an 
individual for assisting another in committing suicide, but not for encouraging or advising 
another to commit suicide; applying strict scrutiny).  
 10. See Timothy Zick, Professional Rights Speech, 47 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1289, 1318 (2016) 
(noting the frequency with which professionals engage in speech related to clients’ 
constitutional or legal rights). 
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Amendment.
11
 In a case containing its most authoritative statement 
on the issue, Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. 
Casey, the Court dismissed a free speech challenge to Pennsylvania’s 
abortion-specific informed consent statute in three brief sentences: 
All that is left of petitioners’ argument is an asserted First 
Amendment right of a physician not to provide information 
about the risks of abortion, and childbirth, in a manner 
mandated by the State. To be sure, the physician’s First 
Amendment rights not to speak are implicated, see Wooley v. 
Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 97 S.Ct. 1428, 51 L.Ed.2d 752 (1977), 
but only as part of the practice of medicine, subject to 
reasonable licensing and regulation by the State, cf. Whalen v. 
Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 603, 97 S.Ct. 869, 878, 51 L.Ed.2d 64 
(1977). We see no constitutional infirmity in the requirement 
that the physician provide the information mandated by the 
State here.
12
 
 
 11. Id. at 1335. 
 12. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 884 (1992). Numerous 
commentators have criticized the Court’s First Amendment analysis in Casey as incomplete. 
See, e.g., Post, supra note 1, at 946 (referring to the Supreme Court’s analysis of the First 
Amendment issues in Casey as “puzzling”); Jennifer M. Keighley, Physician Speech and 
Mandatory Ultrasound Laws: The First Amendment’s Limit on Compelled Ideological Speech, 
34 CARDOZO L. REV. 2347, 2356 (2012) (describing the Supreme Court’s discussion of the 
First Amendment in Casey as “incredibly limited”); Sonia M. Suter, The First Amendment and 
Physician Speech in Reproductive Decision Making, 43 J.L. MED & ETHICS 22, 24 (2015) 
(criticizing the Casey opinion on the grounds that it “failed to characterize the nature of the 
compelled speech, specify the strength of the First Amendment interest, or articulate the 
standard of review that applied”); Daniel Halberstam, Commercial Speech, Professional 
Speech, and the Constitutional Status of Social Institutions, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 771, 773 (1999) 
(noting that the Casey passage “provides little guidance” on First Amendment issues); Scott W. 
Gaylord, A Matter of Context: Casey and the Constitutionality of Compelled Physician Speech, 
43 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 35, 36 (2015) (describing courts’ struggle to determine the proper 
standard of review to use in light of Supreme Court precedent); B. Jessie Hill, Casey Meets the 
Crisis Pregnancy Centers, 43 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 59, 60 (2015) (noting that the Supreme Court 
“has not addressed the First Amendment standards applicable to professional speech at length,” 
and has discussed them “only obliquely”); Claudia E. Haupt, Professional Speech, 125 YALE 
L.J. 1238, 1259 (2016) (describing the doctrinal basis of professional speech as “indeterminate 
at best,” and describing the Supreme Court’s pronouncements in Casey as “cryptic”). See also 
Stuart v. Camnitz, 774 F.3d. 238, 249 (4th Cir. 2014) (“The single paragraph in Casey does not 
assert that physicians forfeit their First Amendment rights in the procedures surrounding 
abortions, nor does it announce the proper level of scrutiny to be applied to abortion regulations 
that compel speech to the extraordinary extent present here.”). 
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Lower courts since Casey have struggled to identify the appropriate 
constitutional standards for reviewing state regulations of physician 
speech, and the result is an uncertain body of law with a great deal of 
room for creative argument.
13
 
The purpose of this Article is to clarify the boundaries of 
physicians’ First Amendment rights when communicating with 
patients. More specifically, this Article seeks to identify the most 
doctrinally consistent reading of Supreme Court free speech 
jurisprudence to understand what limits the First Amendment’s 
protection against compelled speech imposes in the context of state 
informed consent mandates.
14
 Its conclusion is that as a general 
matter, physicians have First Amendment rights that are independent 
of (and therefore supplement) their patients’ constitutional rights, but 
that these rights are limited. The First Amendment permits states to 
impose physician speech mandates that are reasonably related to the 
regulation of medical practice—a regulatory sphere that has been 
interpreted quite broadly. The mandate must, however, compel 
disclosure of only “factual and uncontroversial” information; that 
said, there is a great deal of ambiguity about what this limitation 
means. Informed consent mandates that require physicians to 
communicate “ideological” speech are likely subject to strict 
scrutiny; though, again, the definition of what counts as “ideological” 
speech is widely disputed. And while an otherwise unconstitutional 
speech mandate will not be cured simply because a physician can 
disassociate himself from the objectionable speech, there is some 
uncertainty as to whether a physician’s inability to disassociate 
himself from otherwise factual, uncontroversial, and ideological 
informed consent mandates might render those mandates 
unconstitutional under the Supreme Court’s compelled speech 
jurisprudence. 
 
 13. Zick, supra note 10, at 1298. 
 14. This Article focuses exclusively on compulsions of physician speech, rather than 
prohibitions, which might be evaluated under different constitutional standards. Suter, supra 
note 12, at 28; Post, supra note 1, at 980–81; Martha Swartz, Physician-Patient Communication 
and the First Amendment After Sorrell, 17 MICH. ST. J. MED. & L. 101, 113–14 (2012). But see 
Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 796 (1988) (“There is certainly 
some difference between compelled speech and compelled silence, but in the context of 
protected speech, the difference is without constitutional significance . . . .”). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol50/iss1/2
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While the primary context in which this question has arisen is that 
of abortion-specific informed consent mandates, this inquiry has 
broader implications for informed consent law as a whole.
15
 If the 
First Amendment imposes substantial limits on the type of physician 
speech that states can compel, then every state informed consent 
law—from the most benign to the most controversial—is potentially 
at risk. It is the Author’s hope that this Article’s point-by-point 
explanation of the facts, fictions, and open questions relating to this 
issue will provide readers with an accessible guide to First 
Amendment doctrine in the context of compelled physician speech. 
FICTION: PHYSICIAN SPEECH RECEIVES NO PROTECTION UNDER 
THE FIRST AMENDMENT. 
FACT: PHYSICIAN SPEECH DOES RECEIVE SOME PROTECTION 
UNDER THE FIRST AMENDMENT. 
Healthcare providers in the United States have been heavily regulated 
since the 1800s. Most notably, physicians whose practice departs 
from the standard of care are subject to malpractice liability. 
Malpractice suits arise not only when injury results from a 
physician’s actions, but also when injury results from a physician’s 
words—for example, when the physician gives a patient incorrect 
medical advice, fails to tell a patient about a treatment option, or fails 
to inform a patient of risks associated with treatment. As Robert Post 
notes, “Without so much as a nod to the First Amendment, doctors 
are routinely held liable for malpractice for speaking or for failing to 
speak.”16 In this light, it may first appear that physicians’ rights to 
protection from state speech regulations are nonexistent.
17
  
 
 15. Other less-controversial contexts in which informed consent disclosure mandates have 
come under dispute include breast cancer counseling (Susan G. Nayfield et al., Statutory 
Requirements for Disclosure of Breast Cancer Treatment Alternatives, 86 J. NAT’L CANCER 
INSTIT. 1202 (1994); Nancy M. Capello, Decade of ‘Normal’ Mammography Reports—The 
Happygram, 10 J. AMER. COLL. RADIOL. 903 (2013); Outdated Breast Cancer Informed 
Consent Law Repealed, PENN. MED. SOC’Y, http://www.pamedsoc.org/MainMenuCategories/ 
Laws-Politics/News-from-Harrisburg/Legislation-News/Breast-cancer-informed-consent.html (last 
updated Feb. 20, 2014)); end-of-life care (Patient Self-Determination Act, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1395cc(f)(1) (2000); and dental amalgams (see Post, supra note 1). 
 16. Post, supra note 1, at 950. 
 17. Id. at 951 (noting that First Amendment values “seem to carry very little force” in the 
context of informed consent); Keighley, supra note 12, at 2348–49 (noting that circuit courts’ 
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But while the practice of medicine is highly regulated, and while 
reasonable medical regulations are rarely challenged by health care 
providers, this does not lead to the conclusion that physicians lack 
First Amendment rights altogether.
18
 
First, some government speech mandates would raise obvious 
First Amendment concerns.
19
 If, for example, a state required that 
physicians tell their patients that the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act (PPACA) infringes on their personal liberties, or 
that legislators who vote in favor of PPACA ought not be re-elected, 
surely the state would bear a significant burden in defending such a 
law against a First Amendment challenge.
20
  
Moreover, First Amendment jurisprudence in the context of pure 
commercial speech, a category of speech that receives lesser 
constitutional protection than private speech, provides that even state 
mandates of messages that are not as politically or ideologically 
charged are subject to constitutional review under the Zauderer and 
Central Hudson standards.
21
 For example, we would likely view 
“with constitutional alarm” any laws that prohibited physicians from 
communicating truthful information to patients, or compelled 
physicians to convey inaccurate or misleading information.
22
 While 
courts and commentators have struggled to identify the precise 
boundaries of the distinction between commercial and professional 
 
decisions in abortion informed consent cases suggest that “physicians retain virtually no First 
Amendment rights while they are practicing medicine.”); Zick, supra note 10, at 1292 (noting 
that malpractice and professional licensing laws “are typically merely considered incidental 
regulations of speech, and as such are not generally subject to First Amendment challenge or 
scrutiny”); id. at 1297 (citing Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181, 232 (1985)). 
 18. See generally Post, supra note 1; Keighley, supra note 12; Halberstam, supra note 12; 
Zick, supra note 10. 
 19. Zick, supra note 10 at 1321–22 (citing examples). 
 20. See, e.g., Hill, supra note 12, at 65–66 (noting that ideologically charged compelled 
physician speech would be subject to a high standard of scrutiny). But see Post, supra note 1, at 
952 (arguing that the reason for striking down a law compelling physicians to speak on political 
matters is because such a law would not count as regulation of professional speech; rather, it 
would “compel speech that is not understood as included within the practice of medicine,” and 
therefore be subject to Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977)). See also infra text at notes 
32–33. 
 21. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626 
(1985); Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980).  
 22. Post, supra note 1, at 977–78. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol50/iss1/2
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speech,
23
 many agree that professional speech ought to receive at 
least as much protection (if not more) than commercial speech.
24
 As 
Daniel Halberstam writes, “[a]t a minimum, professional speech 
should be accorded no less protection than commercial speech . . . . 
Indeed, as compared to commercial speech, we might even expect the 
deeper relationship between physician and patient to lead, at least in 
some cases, to protection beyond that afforded to commercial 
speech.”25  
Despite the intuitive appeal of the claim that professional speech 
should be entitled to at least the same level of protection as 
commercial speech, as a practical matter, the First Amendment 
protections physicians receive in the context of medical practice are 
likely to be somewhat limited. As Robert Post notes, “in the context 
of medical practice we insist upon competence, not debate, and so we 
subject professional speech to an entirely different regulatory 
regime.”26 It would indeed be problematic to envision a degree of 
First Amendment protection that “would render ordinary informed 
consent doctrine constitutionally questionable, so that every 
malpractice case involving informed consent would suddenly entail 
large constitutional questions.”27 The rest of this Article outlines the 
contours of these First Amendment protections, limited as they might 
be. 
FICTION: PHYSICIANS’ FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS ARE 
MERELY DERIVATIVE OF THEIR PATIENTS’ RIGHTS. 
FACT: PHYSICIANS HAVE FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS 
INDEPENDENT OF THEIR PATIENTS. 
The claim that physicians’ First Amendment rights are merely 
derivative of their patients’ rights—rather than arising from the 
physicians’ own constitutional interests—is a common 
 
 23. See generally id. at 974–78; Suter, supra note 12, at 23; Swartz, supra note 14, at 122. 
 24. See, e.g., Post supra note 1, at 977–78; Keighley, supra note 12, at 2367. 
 25. Halberstam, supra note 12, at 838. 
 26. Post, supra note 1, at 950. 
 27. Id. at 973. See also id. at 981 (“The history and importance of mandated medical 
disclosures is so entrenched that it cannot be called into constitutional question.”). 
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misconception, one grounded in the Supreme Court’s language in 
Whalen v. Roe.
28
 
Whalen v. Roe, one of the two cases cited in Casey as relevant to 
the issue of physicians’ First Amendment rights, considered the 
constitutional implications of New York statutes requiring physicians 
to report patients’ prescription drug information to the state. The 
petitioners in Whalen were patients bringing Fourteenth Amendment 
privacy claims, as well as physicians independently alleging that the 
laws violate the Fourteenth Amendment by “unnecessarily invad[ing] 
. . . the doctor’s right to prescribe treatment for his patients solely on 
the basis of medical considerations.”29 In rejecting the physicians’ 
claim, the Court held that it was “derivative from, and therefore no 
stronger than, the patients.”30  
Notably, the physicians’ claim in Whalen was not a First 
Amendment claim about the right to speak, but rather a Fourteenth 
Amendment claim about the right to prescribe without undue 
interference by the state. And the Supreme Court’s decision in Casey, 
while containing a brief citation to Whalen, by no means established 
that physicians’ First Amendment rights are merely derivative of 
their patients’ rights.  
For example, consider a law like the one described earlier, 
requiring physicians to make statements opposing PPACA when 
meeting with patients. Any First Amendment objection the physician 
might have to such a law, and any constitutional challenge thereby 
brought, would surely be separate from her patients’ right to privacy 
in medical decision-making.
31
 A patient making medical decisions is 
 
 28. 429 U.S. 589 (1977). See Gaylord, supra note 12, at 44 (“As Whalen instructs, the 
physicians’ rights are derivative of her patients’ . . . [b]ecause the physician’s rights are derived 
from those of his or her patient, the doctor cannot receive greater protection under the First 
Amendment than the patient gets under the due process clause.”); Halberstam, supra note 12, at 
835 (“The First Amendment aspect of [the contraception and abortion] decisions has frequently 
gone unappreciated, in part . . . due to the Court’s own statements implying that a physician’s 
constitutional rights are to be subsumed under the rights of the patient to receive treatment.”). 
 29. Appellees’ Brief at *5, Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977) (No. 75-839), 1976 WL 
181401 (U.S); Whalen, 429 U.S. at 604 (referring to physicians’ argument that the laws “impair 
their right to practice medicine free of unwarranted state interference”). 
 30. Whalen, 429 U.S. at 604. 
 31. Note, however, that the precise contours of a patient’s constitutional rights to privacy 
in medical decision-making are far from clear. See, e.g., Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 
497 U.S. 261, 279 (1990) (assuming, without deciding, that a patient’s constitutional liberty 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol50/iss1/2
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not constrained in her choices if her physician makes political 
statements during their encounter; she may be offended, but unless 
the physician makes these statements against the patient’s objections, 
the patient’s right of autonomous decision-making is not infringed in 
any way. This scenario demonstrates that physicians’ rights to speak 
freely can be infringed upon by state regulation without an associated 
infringement on the patients’ constitutional rights. 
The scenario above might, however, be challenged on the grounds 
that it does not in fact represent a case of compelled professional 
speech. Just because a person holds a license to practice medicine 
does not mean that every word she says will be considered 
“professional speech,” even if she utters those words while providing 
medical care to a patient.
32
 Similarly, not every state speech mandate 
affecting physicians should be treated as a regulation of professional 
speech; mandates of ideological or political statements, for example, 
may be better interpreted as compulsions of private speech subject to 
the dictates of Wooley and Barnette.
33
 Thus, one might argue that 
while physicians have First Amendment rights as private speakers, 
independent of their patients, their rights to speak as professionals are 
necessarily derivative. 
A compelling defense to this challenge is offered by Claudia 
Haupt, who theorizes a model of professional speech rights grounded 
in shared knowledge communities.
34
 She argues that separate and 
apart from the patient’s interest in decisional autonomy, physicians 
have an independent autonomy interest in ensuring that their speech 
is consistent with professional norms.
35
 “The professional not only 
speaks for herself, but also as a member of a learned profession—that 
is, the knowledge community.”36 Therefore, the speaker has an 
“autonomy interest in communicating her message according to the 
 
interest under the Fourteenth Amendment encompasses the refusal of lifesaving medical 
treatment). 
 32. Post, supra note 1, at 952–53; Halberstam, supra note 12, at 843. Post offers, as 
examples, a spontaneous utterance made by a physician who twists his ankle, or a prayer said 
by a surgeon before an operation. Post, supra note 1, at 952 (concluding that only speech that 
“forms . . . the practice of medicine” counts as professional speech). 
 33. Post, supra note 1, at 952; Haupt, supra note 12, at 1299–1300.  
 34. See generally Haupt, supra note 12. 
 35. Id. at 1272–73. 
 36. Id.  
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standards of the profession to which she belongs . . . . Physicians, for 
instance, thus cannot be compelled to speak in a way that undermines 
their profession’s scientific insights.”37  
Post offers another nuanced explanation of the imperfect overlap 
between physicians’ First Amendment rights and patients’ 
constitutional rights: he recognizes that physicians have independent 
First Amendment rights to freedom of speech, but acknowledges that 
the reasons they hold those rights may be more closely tied to the 
patient’s right to accurate medical information than to traditional 
justifications offered in defense of the right to freedom of speech, 
such as the speaker’s autonomy interests, the importance of 
maintaining a free marketplace of ideas, or the value of public 
discourse to democratic self-governance.
38
 However, the fact that the 
values underpinning the importance of free speech vary depending on 
the speaker does not imply that a professional speaker lacks 
independent First Amendment rights. Under Post’s view, therefore, 
while physicians may raise free speech challenges to state laws 
compelling informed consent speech, the patients’ interests in 
obtaining accurate information surely has some relevance to the 
constitutional analysis.
39
 
 
 37. Id. (emphasis added). 
 38. Post, supra note 1, at 977–80, 984–85. See also Keighley, supra note 12, at 2370–77 
(discussing, among other issues, the limited applicability of the “marketplace of ideas” 
argument to context of physician-patient communication); Zick, supra note 10, at 1344–45 
(“Commentators have argued that professional speech regulations generally implicate the free 
speech rights of both clients and professionals, and that coverage and protection for 
professional speech is justified under some or all of the principal First amendment theories—
autonomy, self-government, and the search for truth.”). 
 39. Post, supra note 1, at 985 (arguing that while medical providers have a right to sue 
when they are forced to communicate misleading information, “the content of this right must be 
determined by the public’s interest in the receipt of unbiased, expert, medical information.”). 
See also Robert Post, Compelled Commercial Speech, 117 W. VA. L. REV. 867 (2015) 
[hereinafter Post, Compelled Commercial Speech] (discussing the informational function of 
commercial communication); Helen Norton, Truth and Lies in the Workplace: Employer 
Speech and the First Amendment, MINN. L. REV. at 8 (forthcoming 2016), draft available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2738808&download=yes [hereinafter Norton, 
Truth and Lies in the Workplace] (arguing that while individual professional speakers like 
physicians and attorneys “have substantial expressive interests of their own, governments—and 
courts—often choose to privilege their listeners’ autonomy, enlightenment and self-government 
interests in receiving accurate information”); Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United 
States, 559 U.S. 229, 249 (2010) (citing Zauderer for the proposition that “First Amendment 
protection for commercial speech is justified in large part by the information’s value to 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol50/iss1/2
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Whichever interpretation the reader may find more compelling, it 
is clear that while the patient’s right to accurate information that 
fosters autonomous medical decision-making is one interest at stake 
in cases of compelled physician speech, it is far from the only 
relevant interest. The boundaries of a physician’s right to speak freely 
may be impacted by the patient’s informational needs, but this does 
not lead to the conclusion that the physician’s First Amendment 
rights are purely derivative. 
FACT: LAWS COMPELLING PHYSICIAN SPEECH SATISFY FIRST 
AMENDMENT SCRUTINY IF THEY ARE REASONABLY RELATED 
TO THE REGULATION OF MEDICAL PRACTICE. 
OPEN QUESTION: HOW FAR DO THE STATE’S INTERESTS IN 
REGULATING THE MEDICAL PROFESSION EXTEND? 
In Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, the 
Supreme Court rejected the physicians’ First Amendment challenge 
to Pennsylvania’s informed consent requirements on the grounds that 
“the physician’s First Amendment rights not to speak are implicated, 
but only as part of the practice of medicine, subject to reasonable 
licensing and regulation by the State.”40 This is consistent with the 
Court’s jurisprudence regarding government regulation of 
professional speech in the practice of the law, which holds that such 
regulation is permissible only if it aligns with the state’s interest in 
 
consumers.”). But see Robert Post, A Doctor Has Limited First Amendment Rights, N.Y. TIMES 
(Aug. 21, 2014, 2:03 PM), http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2014/08/20/when-do-
doctors-have-the-right-to-speak/a-doctor-has-limited-first-amendment-rights (“A doctor may 
sue to raise this constitutional issue, but it is misleading to imagine that the doctor is asserting 
her personal First Amendment rights to speak as she wishes. It is more accurate to imagine that 
she is a constitutional spokeswoman for the rights of her patients to be informed. This is 
analogous to the kind of First Amendment rights we apply in the domain of what is known as 
‘commercial speech.’”).  
 40. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 884 (1992) (internal citations 
omitted). This phrasing has been interpreted by some scholars to mean that physicians’ First 
Amendment objections to compelled speech are subject to merely rational basis review. See, 
e.g., Gaylord, supra note 12, at 36. But see Halberstam, supra note 12, at 837 (cautioning that 
the Casey passage should not be interpreted as requiring “the kind of rationality review used for 
economic regulations under the Due Process clause,” but rather “a more stringent rationality 
review with some consideration of the First Amendment values ‘implicated’ in the 
communications between professional and client”). 
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professional regulation as a whole.
41
 In Keller v. State Bar of 
California, a case rejecting the California Bar’s use of compulsory 
attorney dues to finance ideological activities, the Court held that bar 
dues could only be constitutionally used to fund activities germane to 
the state’s interest in “regulating the legal profession and improving 
the quality of legal services.”42 Likewise, in Legal Services Corp. v. 
Velazquez, the Court rejected restrictions on federally funded 
attorney speech on the grounds that they “distort[ed] the legal system 
by altering the traditional role of the attorneys,” thus tying the 
permissibility of speech restrictions to the state’s interest in 
professional regulation.
43
 In Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, another 
attorney speech case, the Court wrote that “[w]hen a state regulation 
implicates First Amendment rights, the Court must balance those 
interests against the State’s legitimate interest in regulating the 
activity in question.”44 A similar theme was raised in Zauderer, when 
the Court tied the permissibility of compelling attorneys to disclose 
information in advertisements to the state’s interest in preventing 
consumer deception about the terms under which attorney services 
are available.
45
 
It is insufficient, however, to end this inquiry by concluding that 
the state’s power to regulate physician speech is grounded in its 
rights to regulate the medical profession as a whole. Unless we 
understand the precise nature of the state’s interest in medical 
regulation and examine how far the state’s powers to regulate 
medicine might extend, this conclusion is incomplete.  
States are authorized to regulate medicine and other professions 
by virtue of their police power, the unenumerated power to protect 
 
 41. Hill, supra note 12, at 61–62 (noting that the Supreme Court has “drawn the line at 
government regulations that distort the speech of professionals in ways that do not appear to 
serve any traditional government interest in regulating the profession”). 
 42. Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 496 U.S. 1, 13–14 (1990). 
 43. Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 544 (2001). 
 44. Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030, 1075 (1991). See also Lowe v. SEC, 472 
U.S. 181, 228-29 (White, J. concurring) (noting that professional licensing and qualification 
standards do not violate the First Amendment even when the profession’s work is 
communicative in nature). 
 45. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 
651 (1985).  
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the health, safety, and welfare of a state’s citizenry.46 As explained by 
the Supreme Court in Dent v. West Virginia, it is “[t]he power of the 
State to provide for the general welfare of its people [that] authorizes 
it to prescribe all such regulations as in its judgment will secure or 
tend to secure them against the consequences of ignorance and 
incapacity, as well as of deception and fraud.”47 The goal of medical 
regulation as a whole is widely understood to be protecting patients 
by ensuring that physicians satisfy the standards considered 
appropriate—by legislators, licensing boards, and medical 
practitioners—to the medical profession.48 Thus, “professional 
standards of care can provide at least partial guidance concerning the 
proper scope of professional speech regulations.”49 
However, legislators and medical boards tend to interpret the 
boundaries of permissible medical regulation quite broadly. For 
example, in the realm of physician licensure and discipline, 
physicians are frequently disciplined for “unethical conduct,” even 
when that conduct takes place outside their professional lives.
50
 
 
 46. See Nadia N. Sawicki, Character, Competence, and the Principles of Medical 
Discipline, 13 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 285, 289–90 (2010). 
 47. Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 122 (1889). 
 48. See, e.g., Sawicki, supra note 46, at 289–90, 294–97 (discussing goals of medical 
licensure and discipline); Lauren R. Robbins, Comment, Open Your Mouth and Say ‘Ideology’: 
Physicians and the First Amendment, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 155, 165 (2009) (arguing that 
government regulation of medicine is intended to “ensure that physicians are practicing 
medicine within the profession’s standards”). See also Schware v. Bd. of Bar Exam’rs, 353 U.S. 
232, 239 (1957) (holding that the criteria for professional licensure and discipline “must have a 
rational connection with the applicant’s fitness or capacity to practice” his profession); Dent, 
129 U.S. at 122 (“The nature and extent of the qualifications required must depend primarily 
upon the judgment of the State as to their necessity. If they are appropriate to the calling or 
profession, and attainable by reasonable study or application, no objection to their validity can 
be raised because of their stringency or difficulty. It is only when they have no relation to such 
calling or profession, or are unattainable by such reasonable study and application, that they can 
operate to deprive one of his right to pursue a lawful vocation.”). 
 49. Zick, supra note 10, at 1299 (analyzing the Court’s holding in Milavetz Gallop & 
Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 559 U.S. 229 (2010)). 
 50. The most common grounds for professional discipline of physicians fall into three 
categories: drug and alcohol abuse, criminal convictions, and unspecified “unprofessional 
conduct.” Sawicki, supra note 46, 303–04. Very few of these cases involve misconduct directly 
linked to medical practice—for example, in the context of substance abuse, most physicians are 
disciplined not for practicing medicine under the influence or abusing prescribing privileges, 
but rather for substance abuse problems not manifesting themselves in the professional sphere 
(such as driving under the influence). Id. at 304. Discipline on the basis of criminal conviction, 
likewise, is often based on conduct with no apparent impact on patient safety or public health, 
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Courts frequently uphold disciplinary actions against physicians who 
engage in character-related misconduct, even when that misconduct 
does not directly impact patients’ medical care.51 
This suggests that the requirement that physician speech mandates 
be reasonably related to the regulation of medical practice will not 
serve as much of a limiting factor in evaluating the constitutionality 
of these mandates. Between the spectrum of obviously impermissible 
speech mandates (such as compelled political or ideological speech) 
and mandates of purely medical information lie a host of other 
possible disclosure mandates that physicians will claim fall outside 
the state’s authority, but that could reasonably be interpreted to relate 
to the regulation of medical practice.  
FICTION: LAWS COMPELLING PHYSICIAN SPEECH SATISFY 
FIRST AMENDMENT SCRUTINY ONLY IF THEY REQUIRE 
DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION THAT IS TRUTHFUL, NOT 
MISLEADING, AND RELEVANT TO PATIENTS. 
FACT: LAWS COMPELLING PHYSICIAN SPEECH SATISFY FIRST 
AMENDMENT SCRUTINY ONLY IF THEY REQUIRE DISCLOSURE 
OF PURELY FACTUAL AND UNCONTROVERSIAL INFORMATION. 
OPEN QUESTION: WHAT QUALIFIES AS “PURELY FACTUAL 
AND UNCONTROVERSIAL” INFORMATION? 
In Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, the 
Supreme Court held that informed consent mandates for abortions 
passed constitutional muster so long as the state was only compelling 
physicians to provide “truthful and not misleading” information 
“relevant” to a woman’s decision.52 This standard has since been used 
by lower courts in evaluating abortion-related informed consent 
requirements, and correctly so. But it is essential to recognize that the 
“truthful, not misleading, and relevant” requirement is a condition on 
the constitutionality of disclosure laws under the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s “undue burden” standard, rather than a condition of the 
 
such as personal income tax fraud, shoplifting, public drunkenness, and violence against 
friends, family, or strangers outside the treatment context. Id. at 304–05. 
 51. Id.  
 52. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 882–83 (1992). 
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First Amendment.
53
 Therefore, in cases where the physician’s First 
Amendment rights are not expressed in a context of a woman’s 
Fourteenth Amendment right (as where states impose informed 
consent mandates in non-reproductive contexts), the “truthful, not 
misleading, and relevant” requirement would not apply. 
To understand the requirements for evaluating physician speech 
mandates outside the abortion context, we must turn instead to 
Zauderer, a compelled-speech case dealing with attorney 
advertising.
54
 In Zauderer, the Court upheld a state law requiring 
attorneys to include “purely factual and uncontroversial information” 
about the terms of their services in advertising.
55
 Although attorneys 
are professionals, the Court described this case as one dealing with 
commercial speech, likely because the case dealt exclusively with 
attorneys’ commercial advertisements rather than their speech in 
communications with clients.
56
 For the reasons noted above, 
however, the Court would likely treat professional speech as being 
entitled to at least the same level of protection as commercial speech, 
if not more. Therefore, courts facing First Amendment challenges to 
 
 53. Id. at 883 (holding that the informed consent requirements about fetal characteristics 
and post-pregnancy assistance “cannot be considered a substantial obstacle to obtaining an 
abortion, and, it follows, there is no undue burden” in its analysis of the patients’ Fourteenth 
Amendment claims). See generally Post, supra note 1, at 945–46 (noting that only after 
introducing the “truthful and not misleading” standard in the context of the patients’ due 
process claim did the court turn to the First Amendment arguments); Keighley, supra note 12, 
at 2354 et seq (noting that the Casey opinion’s “brief treatment of the First Amendment issues” 
arose only after its discussion of the Fourteenth Amendment undue burden standard and 
provided “minimal information about how the Court views the interplay between the state’s 
ability to regulate the medical profession and physicians’ First Amendment rights”); Suter, 
supra note 12, at 23–24 (noting the distinction between the “bulk of the plurality opinion,” 
which addressed the substantive due process issue and the application of the undue burden 
standard to the informed consent law, and the “mere two sentences” of discussion of the First 
Amendment issues). 
 54. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626 
(1985). 
 55. Id. Some commentators have interpreted Zauderer’s requirement that the disclosure be 
factual as being linked to the requirement that a disclosure be a reasonable regulation of 
commercial activity. See Post, supra note 1, at 971 (arguing, with respect to abortion informed 
consent laws, “[i]f the disclosures required . . . are false, [the state] can have no legitimate 
interest in mandating them, and they are unconstitutional because irrational”). 
 56. Note that one lower court has questioned whether the Zauderer test is even applicable 
outside the advertising context. Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. SEC, 800 F.3d 518, 522 (D.C. Cir. 
2015) (“[T]he Supreme Court’s opinion in Zauderer is confined to advertising, emphatically 
and, one may infer, intentionally.”). 
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physician speech mandates should, at the very least, evaluate the 
compelled speech to see if it is “purely factual and uncontroversial.”57 
This, in fact, is the approach that the Third Circuit took in Casey.
58
 
Robert Post notes that Zauderer’s limitation that disclosure 
mandates be “factual and uncontroversial” may not be an appropriate 
test in the professional speech context, given that professionals by 
their very nature are required to give their clients opinions (legal 
opinions, medical opinions, etc.) in addition to providing them with 
facts.
59
 Thus, professional regulations and malpractice standards 
necessarily implicate the ways in which professionals convey 
opinions to their clients. However, I would suggest that the existence 
of liability standards for medical malpractice in contexts where 
physicians’ communications are implicated does not negate the 
applicability of the Zauderer standard to professional contexts. 
Malpractice law imposes liability for physician speech that falls 
outside the standard of care, either because a physician is providing 
incorrect information or dangerous opinions (in which case the threat 
of liability operates as a restriction on speech), or because the 
physician fails to provide information as part of informed consent (in 
 
 57. There remains some uncertainty, however, as to whether the Zauderer test applies 
only in contexts where the state’s interest is preventing consumer deception, or where other 
state interests might justify use of the Zauderer standard. The Supreme Court has not clarified 
this issue. Compare Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. SEC, 748 F.3d 359 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (agreeing with 
R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205, 1213 (2012) that the Zauderer test is 
“limited to cases in which disclosure requirements are ‘reasonably related to the State’s interest 
in preventing deception of consumers’”) with Am. Meat Inst. v. USDA, 760 F.3d 18 (D.C. Cir. 
2014) (overruling Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs, holding that the use of Zauderer is not limited to cases 
where the state’s interest is preventing consumer deception). See also Jennifer M. Keighley, 
Can You Handle the Truth? Compelled Commercial Speech and the First Amendment, 15 U. 
PA. J. CONST. L. 539, 542 (2012) (concluding that the “curing consumer deception” standard is 
only one of many permissible government goals). For the purposes of this Article, it is assumed 
that Zauderer applies more broadly. See Am. Meat Inst., 760 F.3d at 22 (“The language with 
which Zauderer justified its approach, however, sweeps far more broadly than the interest in 
remedying deception.”). 
 58. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 947 F.2d 682, 705–06 (3d Cir. 1991), aff’d in 
part, rev’d in part, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (reviewing Pennsylvania’s abortion informed consent 
requirements under the Zauderer standard). One might question whether there is a practical 
difference between Casey’s “truthful, not misleading and relevant” standard and Zauderer’s 
“factual and uncontroversial” standard. While the two are indeed similar, my interpretation is 
that the Zauderer standard may more limited in what it allows, given how broadly the definition 
of “controversial” might be construed. 
 59. Email from Robert Post, Dean and Sol & Lillian Goldman Professor of Law, Yale 
Law School, to author (Sept. 2, 2015, 09:58 EST) (on file with author).  
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which case the threat of liability effectively operates as a speech 
mandate requiring disclosure of certain types of factual information). 
But in no way does the modern common law of malpractice or 
informed consent require that physicians share specific opinions 
mandated by the state on a particular topic. And to the extent that 
statutory disclosure mandates might require disclosure to all patients 
of opinions not verifiable by factual inquiry—for example, “The best 
treatment in your case would be mastectomy combined with 
chemotherapy”—those would certainly be constitutionally 
problematic. Therefore, it is likely that an inquiry into the 
constitutionality of a professional speech mandate would be subject 
to Zauderer’s “factual and uncontroversial” requirement.  
This, of course, leaves us with the open question of what counts as 
“purely factual and uncontroversial information,” and who bears the 
burden of proving whether this requirement is or is not satisfied.
60
 
The Supreme Court has provided little guidance for determining 
whether a given disclosure is “factual and uncontroversial” under the 
Zauderer standard, as opposed to non-factual or controversial, and 
therefore subject to a different standard of review. In Zauderer, the 
Court did not define “factual and uncontroversial,” but merely 
concluded that disclosures of clients’ cost obligations under 
contingent fee arrangements “easily pass[] muster” under this 
standard.
61
 In Milavetz, a more recent case applying Zauderer to a 
federal requirement that bankruptcy law firms describe themselves as 
“debt relief agencies” in advertisements, the Court evaluated whether 
the mandated disclosure was reasonably related to the state’s interests 
 
 60. For further discussion of the evidentiary and burden-shifting issues, see Post, supra 
note 1, at 972 (arguing that proving falsity under a deferential standard of review “is 
exceedingly difficult, if not impossible,” and suggesting that the First Amendment shifts the 
burden of defending mandated disclosures to the state) and id. at 988 (discussing “exactly how 
divided expert opinion must be before the Constitution will permit the political system to 
override otherwise dominant or officially endorsed professional beliefs”). 
 61. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 652. Cf. Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs., 800 F.3d at 527 (questioning 
whether the Supreme Court in Zauderer intended “factual and uncontroversial” to state a legal 
standard, or whether the reference was merely a descriptive statement about the disclosure 
requirement in that case). 
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without even analyzing if the required disclosure was factual and 
uncontroversial.
62
 
In the absence of further guidance from the Court about what 
types of contested disclosures qualify as factual and uncontroversial, 
lower courts have been challenged to make such determinations on 
their own.
63
 A number of appellate courts have addressed this issue in 
both commercial and professional speech cases. While there is clear 
agreement that a mandated disclosure fails Zauderer’s “factual and 
uncontroversial” requirement if it requires a speaker to communicate 
subjective opinions rather than facts, other issues are less clear.
64
  
A. Matters of Public Debate 
The first question frequently addressed by courts in these contexts 
is whether accurate factual disclosures mandated about subjects that 
are matters of public controversy or debate might be deemed 
“controversial” and therefore outside the scope of Zauderer. In the 
anomalous case of Evergreen Ass’n, Inc. v. City of New York, the 
Second Circuit addressed a New York law requiring crisis pregnancy 
 
 62. Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 559 U.S. 229, 248–53 (2010). 
However, the Court in Milavetz seemed to acknowledge that, if the term “debt relief agencies” 
were found to be misleading, the state could not reasonably argue that mandating the use of this 
phrase was necessary to serve its interest in preventing consumer deception. Id. at 250–53. 
 63. Note, though, that most courts considering mandated disclosure laws have dealt with 
fairly straightforward disclosures of purely factual information. See, e.g., N.Y. State Rest. Ass’n 
v. NYC Bd. of Health, 556 F.3d 114 (2d Cir. 2009) (holding that a law requiring restaurants to 
post calorie information on their menus required disclosure of factual information and was 
therefore subject to Zauderer review); Nat’l Elec. Mfrs. Ass’n v. Sorrell, 272 F.3d 104 (2d Cir. 
2001) (treating labeling requirements about the content of and disposal methods for lamps 
containing mercury as requiring disclosure of factual commercial information); United States v. 
Wenger, 427 F.3d 840 (10th Cir. 2005) (treating disclosure of status as a paid stock promoter 
and financial compensation as meeting Zauderer’s factual and uncontroversial requirement). 
 64. See, e.g., Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. SEC, 748 F.3d 359 (D.C. Cir. 2014), adhered to on 
reh’g sub nom., Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. SEC, 800 F.3d 518 (D.C. Cir. 2015), overruled by Am. 
Meat Inst. v. USDA, 760 F.3d 18 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (holding that the phrase “conflict free” is a 
“metaphor that conveys moral responsibility,” and one with which an issuer might strongly 
disagree); Video Software Dealers Ass’n v. Schwarzenegger, 556 F.3d 950, 966–67 (9th Cir. 
2009) (holding that requiring an “18” label on violent video games “does not convey factual 
information” unless the game can be legally classified as “violent”), aff’d sub nom., Brown v. 
Entm’t Merchants Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 180 L. Ed. 2d 708 (2011) (note, however, that the 
Supreme Court did not address this issue on appeal); Entm’t Software Ass’n v. Blagojevich, 
469 F.3d 641, 652 (7th Cir. 2006) (holding that an “18” sticker “ultimately communicates a 
subjective and highly controversial message—that the game’s content is sexually explicit”).  
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centers to disclose, among other things, whether they provide 
referrals for abortion, emergency contraception, or prenatal care 
(Services Disclosure) and whether they have a licensed medical 
provider on staff (Status Disclosure).
65
 Although these disclosures 
appear on their face to be purely factual in nature—that is, they can 
be verified or rejected objectively by reference to undisputed facts—
the court rejected the Services disclosure as unconstitutional on the 
grounds that it “mandates discussion of controversial political 
topics”66 and “requires centers to mention controversial services that 
some pregnancy services centers . . . oppose.
”67
  
However, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in 
American Meat Institute v. USDA took a different view when 
considering a USDA rule requiring country-of-origin labels on meat 
products.
68
 Neither party disputed that the information required on 
the label was factual, and the court squarely rejected the idea that the 
labels might be deemed controversial because they require 
communication of “a message that is controversial for some reason 
other than a dispute about simple factual accuracy.”69 A dissenting 
opinion in National Ass'n of Manufacturers v. SEC agreed, 
interpreting the court’s decision in American Meat Institute to mean 
that a required disclosure of undisputed facts that somehow “touches 
on a ‘controversial’ topic . . . cannot render the disclosure 
‘controversial’ in the sense meant by Zauderer.”70 Numerous other 
courts and commentators have likewise concluded that the question 
 
 65. Evergreen Ass’n, Inc. v. City of N.Y., 740 F.3d 233 (2d Cir. 2014), cert. denied sub 
nom. Evergreen Ass’n, Inc. v. City of N.Y., N.Y., 135 S. Ct. 435 (2014), and Pregnancy Care 
Ctr. of N.Y. v. City of N.Y., N.Y., 135 S. Ct. 435 (2014). 
 66. Id. at 250. The court distinguished the Services Disclosure from the Status Disclosure, 
which it upheld, describing it as a “brief, bland, and non-pejorative disclosure.” Id. 
 67. Id. at 245 n.6.  
 68. Am. Meat Inst. v. USDA, 760 F.3d 18 (2014). The USDA rule required disclosing the 
location of each step of the meat production process: “For example, meat derived from an 
animal born in Canada and raised and slaughtered in the United States, which formerly could 
have been labeled ‘Product of the United States and Canada,’ would now have to be labeled 
‘Born in Canada, Raised and Slaughtered in the United States.’” Id. at 21. 
 69. Id. at 27. 
 70. Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. SEC, 800 F.3d 518, 538 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (Srinivasan, J., 
dissenting). However, the majority opinion in this case, when discussing the challenges in 
understanding “uncontroversial” disclosures to be those based on opinion rather than facts, 
seemingly interpreted the factual country-of-origin labels in American Meat Institute as being 
“controversial” for reasons other than factual accuracy. Id. at 528.  
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of whether a required disclosure is “controversial” speaks only to its 
factual accuracy, rather than its mere relevance to a topic of public 
debate.
71
 Indeed, this interpretation seems most consistent with the 
Supreme Court’s statements in the context of state restrictions on 
speech, where the Court has held that public controversy surrounding 
accurate factual statements do not render that speech non-commercial 
and therefore subject to a higher standard of scrutiny.
72
  
B. Confusing Language and Statutory Definitions 
A second question courts have asked about Zauderer’s “factual 
and uncontroversial” requirement is whether a mandated disclosure 
might violate that test if it uses language that is misleading, 
confusing, or might lead to consumer misunderstanding because it 
relies on a statutory definition that differs from the plain meaning of 
the language used.
73
 In National Ass’n of Manufacturers v. SEC, for 
example, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
considered an SEC rule requiring firms to describe their products as 
“not DRC conflict free” if they are made from minerals originating in 
 
 71. See Post, Compelled Commercial Speech, supra note 39, at 910 (arguing that 
“mandated factual disclosures” should not be treated as constitutionally suspect simply 
“because they occur in circumstances of circumstances of acrimonious political controversy,” 
and that Zauderer’s “uncontroversial” requirement would “seem best interpreted as a 
description of the epistemological status of the” required disclosure); Norton, Truth and Lies in 
the Workplace, supra note 39, at 40–41 (“An approach more consistent with the protection of 
listeners’ First Amendment interests would thus understand ‘factual and uncontroversial’ in this 
context to refer to assertions that are provable (or disprovable) as a factual matter in the same 
way required of contested assertions in defamation, perjury, and antifraud law.”); Gaylord, 
supra note 12, at 49 n.91 (“In the context of professional speech, ‘uncontroversial’ cannot 
prohibit disclosures related to controversial topics—otherwise Casey would have been decided 
differently.”); Grocery Mfrs. Ass’n v. Sorrell, No. 5:14-cv-117, 2015 WL 1931142, at *25-26 
(D. Vt. Apr. 27, 2015) (holding that compelled disclosures may be interpreted as 
“controversial” only when they are opinion-based, and not when they purely factual, despite the 
fact that the disclosure laws were enacted in the context of “partisan debate”). 
 72. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 563 
n.5 (1980) (refusing to “grant broad constitutional protection to any advertising that links a 
product to a current public debate”); Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 68 
(1983) (citing Central Hudson for the proposition that “advertising which ‘links a product to a 
current public debate’ is not thereby entitled to the constitutional protection afforded 
noncommercial speech”). 
 73. See generally Caroline Mala Corbin, Compelled Disclosures, 65 ALA. L. REV. 1277, 
1330 (2014) (referring to the invocation of a statutory definition “to transform a plainly 
ideological statement into a neutral fact” as “sleight of hand”). 
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the Congo or other countries, where such minerals finance or benefit 
armed groups in those countries.
74
 The court concluded that “it is far 
from clear that the description at issue—whether a product is 
‘conflict free’—is factual and non-ideological.”75 
The label “[not] conflict free” is a metaphor that conveys 
moral responsibility for the Congo war. It requires an issuer to 
tell consumers that its products are ethically tainted, even if 
they only indirectly finance armed groups. An issuer, including 
an issuer who condemns the atrocities of the Congo war in the 
strongest terms, may disagree with that assessment of its moral 
responsibility.
76
  
On rehearing, the court again concluded that “the statutory definition 
of ‘conflict free’ cannot save this law.”77 In other words, although the 
phrase “DRC conflict free” was defined in a factual and objectively 
verifiable way,
78
 the phrase could be understood to communicate a 
judgment about moral responsibility, and therefore fall outside of 
Zauderer’s scope. Robert Post interprets the court’s interpretation as 
grounded not in the question of whether the mandated disclosure 
communicates facts, but whether a “reasonable audience” would 
“understand the phrase to mean a confession of ethical taint and 
 
 74. Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. SEC, 748 F.3d 359, 376 (D.C. Cir. 2014), adhered to on reh’g 
sub nom., Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. SEC, 800 F.3d 518 (D.C. Cir. 2015), overruled on other 
grounds by Am. Meat Inst. v. USDA, 760 F.3d 18 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
 75. Id. at 371. See also Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. SEC, 800 F.3d 518, 530 (D.C. Cir. 2015) 
(“In our initial opinion we stated that the description at issue—whether a product is ‘conflict 
free’ or ‘not conflict free’—was hardly ‘factual and non-ideological.’ . . . We see no reason to 
change our analysis in this respect.”). 
 76. Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs., 800 F.3d at 530. 
 77. Id. at 529–30. But see id. at 532 (Srinivasan, J., dissenting) (arguing that the meaning 
of the phrase “conflict free” seems “quite apparent in context,” and that a consumer could “with 
little effort, learn that it carries a specific meaning prescribed by law”). 
 78. Conflict Minerals, 77 Fed. Reg. 56,274, 56,364 (Sept. 12, 2012) (“The term DRC 
conflict free means that a product does not contain conflict minerals necessary to the 
functionality or production of that product that directly or indirectly finance or benefit armed 
groups, as defined in paragraph (d)(2) of this item, in the Democratic Republic of the Congo or 
an adjoining country. Conflict minerals that a registrant obtains from recycled or scrap sources, 
as defined in paragraph (d)(6) of this item, are considered DRC conflict free.”); 15 U.S.C. 
§ 78m(p)(1)(D) (2012) (“[A] product may be labeled as ‘DRC conflict free’ if the product does 
not contain conflict minerals that directly or indirectly finance or benefit armed groups in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo or an adjoining country.”). 
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culpability.”79 Notably, even the dissenting opinion in National Ass’n 
of Manufacturers v. SEC, while disagreeing with the majority’s 
conclusion that the phrase “conflict free” might be misleading, agreed 
that some statutorily defined terms could be misleading enough to 
violate Zauderer’s test.80  
Other federal appellate courts agree. In a dispute about an 
ordinance requiring cell phone sellers to disclose information to 
consumers about radiofrequency emissions, the Ninth Circuit in 
CTIA—The Wireless Ass’n v. City & County of San Francisco held 
that while the “factoids” required to be disclosed were all “literally 
true” in that they had some scientific basis, their overall meaning was 
misleading by omission.
81
 Among other concerns, the court noted that 
the word “risk” was “being used . . . in a way different from the usual 
way”; that the “overall impression” left by the required disclosures 
was “that cell phones are dangerous and that they have somehow 
escaped the regulatory process”; and that the classification of a 
“possible carcinogen” will be misunderstood by the “uninitiated . . . 
as more dangerous than it really is.”82 Additional support for this 
interpretation comes from the Supreme Court’s own language in 
Milavetz, which considered the possibility that the phrase “debt relief 
agency” might be “misleading,” “confusing,” or likely to be 
misunderstood as relevant to the question of whether the disclosure 
 
 79. Post, Compelled Commercial Speech, supra note 39, at 905–06. See also Daniel E. 
Herz-Roiphe, Stubborn Things: An Empirical Approach to Facts, Opinions, and the First 
Amendment, 113 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 47 (2015) (empirical study of whether 
consumers believed the statements mandated in cases like Am. Meat Inst., NAM, United Foods, 
Arnold, and RJ Reynolds constituted pure fact or “some opinion”).  
 80. Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs., 800 F.3d at 540 (Srinivasan, J., dissenting) (“None of this is to 
grant the government carte blanche to compel commercial speakers to voice any prescribed set 
of words as long as the words are defined by statute or regulation. Zauderer does not grant the 
government that kind of license. The government, for instance, could not misleadingly redefine 
‘peace’ as ‘war,’ and then compel a factual statement using the term ‘peace’ on the theory that a 
consumer could consult the government’s redefinition to learn that ‘peace’ in fact means ‘war’ 
in the specific circumstances . . . A consumer would have no reason to suppose that the word 
‘peace’ is a stylized term of art misleadingly redefined to be something far different from its 
ordinary meaning.”). 
 81. CTIA–The Wireless Ass’n v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 827 F. Supp. 2d 1054, 
1060–62 (9th Cir. 2012). 
 82. Id. at 1062–63. 
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law was reasonably related to the state’s interest, as required by 
Zauderer.
83
 
In the context of reproductive care, however, lower courts have 
taken a different approach. These courts instead suggest that words or 
phrases likely to be misinterpreted by patients to have a moral or 
metaphysical meaning (like the phrase “human being”) are not 
constitutionally problematic as long as they have a factually based 
statutory definition.
84
 In South Dakota, for example, a statute 
required physicians to advise patients seeking an abortion that “the 
abortion will terminate the life of a whole, separate, unique, living 
human being.”85 The statute defined the term “human being” as 
“individual living member of the species of Homo sapiens, including 
the unborn human being during the entire embryonic and fetal ages 
from fertilization to full gestation.”86 At issue was whether the 
required disclosure was scientifically and factually accurate. The 
Eighth Circuit in Planned Parenthood Minnesota, North Dakota, 
South Dakota v. Rounds upheld the disclosure, stating that “the 
truthfulness and relevance of the [human being] disclosure . . . 
generates little dispute” because it is based on a biological 
definition.
87
 While acknowledging that “[t]aken in isolation,” the 
human being disclosure “certainly may be read to make a point in the 
debate about the ethics of abortion,” the court held that in conjunction 
with the statutory definition of “human being,” the disclosure 
satisfied constitutional scrutiny.
88
  
 
 83. Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 559 U.S. 229, 250–53 (2010). 
Note, however, that the Court did not consider the question of whether the required disclosures 
were “factual and uncontroversial” under Zauderer. 
 84. While the cases described below analyzed the meaning of the mandated disclosures by 
reference to whether they were “truthful” and “not misleading” under the Casey standard, rather 
than “factual and uncontroversial” under the Zauderer standard, their reasoning would apply in 
both contexts. 
 85. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-23A-10.1(1)(b) (2014). 
 86. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-23A-1(4) (2006). 
 87. Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds, 530 F.3d 724, 735–36 (8th Cir. 
2008). 
 88. Id. The dissenting opinion in Rounds, however, vigorously objected to this conclusion. 
Although a legislature may choose to give words its own unique definition, it cannot 
establish by fiat that the term “human being” has only biological connotations, for the 
constitutional analysis of whether the mandated statements convey factual truths or 
contestable ideology is not controlled by the wording of the Act. 
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The District Court for the Southern District of Indiana reached a 
similar conclusion in Planned Parenthood of Indiana, Inc. v. 
Commissioner of Indiana State Department of Health, a challenge to 
an Indiana statute requiring physicians to inform women seeking 
abortions that “human physical life begins when a human ovum is 
fertilized by a human sperm.”89 Unlike in Rounds, the phrase “human 
physical life” was not statutorily defined; thus the court turned to the 
words’ plain meaning.90 The court described as “significant” the 
inclusion of “the biology-based word ‘physical’” and concluded that 
the mandated statement did not require physicians to address 
“whether the embryo or fetus is a ‘human life’ in the metaphysical 
sense.”91 
C. Omissions and One-Sided Disclosures 
A third relevant question that some courts have considered is 
whether accurate factual information might nevertheless violate the 
“factual and uncontroversial” requirement if it is too one-sided, or 
omits other relevant information necessary to give context. However, 
there is little consensus on this issue. In American Meat Institute, for 
example, the court ultimately upheld country-of-origin labeling 
requirements as being “uncontroversial,” but recognized that “some 
required factual disclosures could be so one-sided or incomplete that 
they would not qualify as ‘factual and uncontroversial’” under 
Zauderer.
92
 The Northern District of California in CTIA likewise 
understood that some disclosures might fail the Zauderer test if they 
 
Id. at 744 (Murphy, J., dissenting). See also Eubanks v. Brown, 604 F. Supp. 141 (W.D. Ky. 
1984), a pre-Casey case considering a Kentucky statute defining “human being” as “any 
member of the species homo sapiens from fertilization until death.” The court in Eubanks found 
this definitional provision unconstitutional on the grounds that it “incorporate[s] into the law a 
definition of life as beginning at fertilization, a theory which the Supreme Court . . . has held 
may not be used by a state in a statute to justify its regulation of abortion.” Id. at 144. 
 89. Planned Parenthood of Ind., Inc. v. Comm’r of Ind. State Dep’t of Health, 794 F. 
Supp. 2d 892, 914 (S.D. Ind. 2011), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Planned Parenthood of 
Ind., Inc. v. Comm’r of Ind. State Dep’t of Health, 699 F.3d 962 (7th Cir. 2012). 
 90. Id. at 917. 
 91. Id. at 918. 
 92. Am. Meat Inst. v. USDA, 760 F.3d 18, 27 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
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were “misleading by omission.”93 In contrast, in a case challenging 
the FDA’s graphic tobacco labeling regulations, the Sixth Circuit in 
Discount Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. United States held that 
although the labeling requirements were “inherently persuasive” and 
not “neutral,” they did in fact describe “the incontestable health 
consequences of using tobacco” and were therefore appropriate for 
analysis under Zauderer.
94
  
In summary, there appears to be wide variation in how lower 
courts approach the issue of what constitutes “factual and 
uncontroversial” speech under Zauderer. The only firm conclusion 
that can be reached is that mandated disclosures of subjective 
opinions do not qualify as “factual” information under Zauderer. A 
somewhat more tentative conclusion is that compelled statements of 
factually undisputed information are unlikely to run afoul of 
Zauderer simply because that information deals with topics of public 
debate or controversy. However, greater uncertainty remains as to 
whether language whose plain meaning differs from its statutory 
definition, or information that is one-sided, fails the factual and 
uncontroversial test. 
FICTION: IN THE MEDICAL CONTEXT, THE STATE MAY COMPEL 
PHYSICIANS TO SPEAK ON IDEOLOGICAL ISSUES. 
FACT: EVEN IN THE MEDICAL CONTEXT, COMPELLED 
IDEOLOGICAL SPEECH IS SUBJECT TO STRICT SCRUTINY. 
OPEN QUESTION: WHAT QUALIFIES AS IDEOLOGICAL SPEECH? 
In Summit Medical Center of Alabama, Inc. v. Riley, physicians 
raised a First Amendment challenge to a statute requiring them to 
provide patients seeking abortions with “ideologically objectionable” 
written materials promoting childbirth over abortion.
95
 The District 
Court for the Middle District of Alabama squarely rejected the 
physicians’ First Amendment claims, dismissing them as being 
 
 93. CTIA–The Wireless Ass’n v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 827 F. Supp. 2d 1054, 
1062 (N.D. Cal. 2011). 
 94. Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. United States, 674 F.3d 509, 526–37 (6th Cir. 
2012). 
 95. Summit Med. Ctr. of Ala., Inc. v. Riley, 274 F. Supp. 2d 1262, 1271 (M.D. Ala. 
2003). 
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precluded by Casey.
96
 According to the court, the Supreme Court in 
Casey “expressly rejected the notion that a state may require 
distribution only of ideologically neutral information regarding 
abortion.”97 
The District Court’s conclusion in Summit flies in the face of 
decades of First Amendment jurisprudence, which consistently holds 
that state mandates of ideological speech are subject to the strictest 
level of scrutiny and are unlikely to ever pass constitutional muster.
98
 
This doctrinal conclusion is no different when the ideological speech 
is being compelled in the physicians’ office as part of informed 
consent to abortion, and Casey does not so hold. 
As explained earlier, Casey’s discussion of the constitutional 
standard applicable to compelled physician speech was incomplete at 
best. The Court’s only mention of potential ideological issues was in 
its discussion of the Fourteenth Amendment implications of the 
informed consent law; it held that the state may enact laws “designed 
to encourage [a woman] to know that there are philosophic and social 
arguments of great weight that can be brought to bear in favor of 
continuing the pregnancy to full term . . . .”99 But in its discussion of 
the First Amendment implications of the Pennsylvania informed 
consent statute, the Court did not use the term “ideological” in 
describing these state preferences, did not reach a conclusion as to 
whether they were “ideological” for constitutional purposes under the 
 
 96. Id.  
 97. Id. at 1270. 
 98. See, e.g., Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 717 (1977) (“[W]here the State’s interest 
is to disseminate an ideology, no matter how acceptable to some, such interest cannot outweigh 
an individual’s First Amendment right to avoid becoming the courier for such message.”); W. 
Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (“If there is any fixed star in 
our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be 
orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to 
confess by word or act their faith therein. If there are any circumstances which permit an 
exception, they do not now occur to us.”). See also Corbin, supra note 73, at 1287 (explaining 
that mandates of ideological speech are treated with greater suspicion than mandates of factual 
speech); Nicole B. Casarez, Don’t Tell Me What to Say: Compelled Speech and the First 
Amendment, 63 MO. L. REV. 929, 948 (1998) (“The fact that the First Amendment prohibits the 
state from compelling speech of a religious, political, or ideological nature has been determined 
beyond question.”). 
 99. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 872 (1992). 
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precedent in Wooley v. Maynard,
100
 and did not discuss the 
constitutional implications of ideological speech mandates in the 
professional context. 
Notably, the Third Circuit below had held that while the 
Pennsylvania informed consent statute did not compel ideological 
speech, if it had, it would have been subject to a higher standard of 
scrutiny.
101
 But the Supreme Court itself did not address this issue on 
appeal, declining to provide further analysis of whether compelling 
physicians to speak ideological messages would be subject to the 
same level of First Amendment scrutiny as the ideological speech in 
Wooley. As Jennifer Keighley writes, “[w]hile the joint opinion’s 
undue burden analysis makes clear that the information in the state 
pamphlet was designed to encourage women to choose childbirth 
over abortion, [it] never addresses how the state’s ideological 
purpose, though permissible under the undue burden framework, 
interacted with physicians’ First Amendment rights.”102 Thus, Casey 
should not be interpreted as permitting compelled ideological speech 
in the informed consent process.
103
 
 
 100. Id. at 884 (citing Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. at 713 (applying strict scrutiny)). 
Wooley v. Maynard involved a First Amendment challenge to a New Hampshire law making it 
a crime to obscure the words “Live Free or Die” on state license plates. Wooley v. Maynard, 
430 U.S. 705. The Supreme Court found the law unconstitutional, holding that “where the 
State’s interest is to disseminate an ideology, no matter how acceptable to some, such interest 
cannot outweigh an individual’s First Amendment right to avoid becoming the courier for such 
message.” Id. at 706–07. 
 101. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 947 F.2d 682, 705–06 (3d Cir. 1991), aff’d in 
part, rev’d in part, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (noting that under Zauderer, “[d]isclosure requirements 
are permissible so long as they are not a state attempt to prescribe what is ‘orthodox in politics, 
nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act 
their faith therein,’” and concluding that none of the Pennsylvania informed consent 
requirements have this intent or effect). 
 102. Keighley, supra note 12, at 2356.  
 103. Id. at 2356; Robbins, supra note 48, at 175 (noting that the parts of Akron and 
Thornnburg that address the constitutional implications of compelled ideological speech in the 
abortion context should still be considered good law); Stuart v. Loomis, 992 F. Supp. 2d 585, 
588 (M.D.N.C. 2014) aff’d sub nom. Stuart v. Camnitz, 774 F.3d 238 (4th Cir. 2014) (“The 
Supreme Court has never held that a state has the power to compel a health care provider to 
speak, in his or her own voice, the state’s ideological message in favor of carrying a pregnancy 
to term . . . .”); Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds, 530 F.3d 724, 734–35 (8th 
Cir. 2008) (“Casey and Gonzales establish that, while the State cannot compel an individual 
simply to speak the State’s ideological message, it can use its regulatory authority to require a 
physician to provide truthful, non-misleading information relevant to a patient’s decision to 
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There are a few ways to explain the Supreme Court’s silence in 
Casey about the First Amendment implications of ideological 
communications in the informed consent process. First, as recognized 
by Keighley,
104
 the Pennsylvania informed consent law did not 
require physicians to convey the state’s pro-childbirth message in 
their own words; it merely required physicians to offer patients the 
opportunity to receive this message as presented in a state 
pamphlet.
105
 It is possible that the Court in Casey did not consider the 
requirement that physicians offer patients a state pamphlet to be 
compulsion to the same degree as Wooley’s requirement that private 
automobiles display a state message on their license plate. 
Alternatively, perhaps the Court, despite referring to the state’s 
motive of exposing women to “philosophic and social arguments of 
great weight” regarding abortion, agreed with the Third Circuit’s 
assessment that the disclosures required by Pennsylvania were not 
ideological in nature (and so not subject to strict scrutiny under 
Wooley).
106
 Or perhaps the Court simply blundered by referencing the 
philosophical nature of the state’s message in its due process analysis 
while neglecting to address this consideration in its free speech 
analysis.  
In any event, it seems clear that the Supreme Court’s holding in 
Casey cannot be read to support the conclusion that compelling 
physicians to make ideological statements in the informed consent 
context should be held to a different level of scrutiny than compelled 
 
have an abortion, even if that information might also encourage the patient to choose childbirth 
over abortion.”). 
 104. Keighley, supra note 12, at 2353. 
 105. The Pennsylvania law required physicians to provide patients directly with 
information about the nature of the abortion procedure, the health risks of the abortion and of 
childbirth, and the probable gestational age of the fetus. Physicians were also required to make 
patients aware of the availability of state-published materials “describing the fetus and 
providing information about medical assistance for childbirth, information about child support 
from the father, and a list of agencies which provide adoption and other services as alternatives 
to abortion.” Casey, 505 U.S. at 881.  
 106. See Casey, 947 F.2d at 705 (noting that the information required by Pennsylvania law 
“is not an attempt to prescribe an orthodoxy in matters of opinion”). See also Tex. Med. 
Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, 667 F.3d 570, 576 (5th Cir. 2012) 
(distinguishing between factual and ideological statements, and noting that the abortion 
informed consent requirements in question “do not fall under the rubric of compelling 
‘ideological’ speech that triggers First Amendment strict scrutiny”). 
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ideological speech in any other contexts. Other Supreme Court 
opinions dealing with professional speech mandates support this 
interpretation. Just two years prior to Casey, for example, the Court 
in Keller v. State Bar of California held that the use of bar dues to 
finance “ideological or political activities to which [attorneys] were 
opposed” violated their free speech rights.107 In so holding, it set forth 
a rule that while the bar may fund activities relevant to the goals of 
“regulating legal profession or improving quality of legal services,” it 
may not “fund activities of an ideological nature which fall outside of 
those areas of activity.”108 Similarly, in Zauderer, the Court upheld 
an Ohio law requiring that attorney advertisements include 
information about how contingent-fee rates are calculated, noting that 
unlike in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, the 
Ohio law did not “attempt[] to ‘prescribe what shall be orthodox in 
politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force 
citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein.’”109 
Indeed, the Court has applied strict scrutiny to mandates of even 
purely factual speech in some commercial contexts, where that 
commercial speech is intertwined with fully protected speech, such as 
speech designed to advocate or inform.
110
 Given that a mandate of 
 
 107. Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 496 U.S. 1, 4 (1990). 
 108. Id. at 13–14. While recognizing that the line between ideological and non-ideological 
speech is unclear, the Court found such a violation in Keller. 
But the extreme ends of the spectrum are clear: Compulsory dues may not be 
expended to endorse or advance a gun control or nuclear weapons freeze initiative; at 
the other end of the spectrum petitioners have no valid constitutional objection to their 
compulsory dues being spent for activities connected with disciplining members of the 
Bar or proposing ethical codes for the profession. 
Id. at 15–16. The Court did not specify the level of constitutional scrutiny that would apply to 
compulsory bar dues funding ideological speech unrelated to the regulation of the legal 
profession; it merely concluded that they would be per se unconstitutional. Id. 
 109. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 
651 (1985) (citing W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943)). See also 
Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott, 521 U.S. 457, 469–70 (1997) (declining to apply strict 
scrutiny to laws requiring fruit growers to pay assessments for generic fruit advertising, on the 
grounds that the laws “do not compel the producers to endorse or to finance any political or 
ideological views”). 
 110. Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781 (1988) (holding 
unconstitutional, under “exacting First Amendment scrutiny,” a law requiring that professional 
fundraisers disclose to potential donors the average percentage of gross receipts actually turned 
over to charities within the previous twelve months). Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utilities 
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ideological speech as part of the informed consent process 
necessarily goes beyond proposing a purely commercial transaction 
or engaging in professional practice, it would likewise be subject to 
strict scrutiny. 
Thus, the best reading of the Supreme Court’s compelled speech 
jurisprudence is that compelled ideological statements in the context 
of professional practice would be subject to strict scrutiny, just as in 
private contexts.
111
 Were a state to adopt an informed consent law 
requiring physicians to make ideological statements to their patients, 
Supreme Court precedent suggests that the law would be upheld only 
if it were designed to achieve a compelling state interest and were 
narrowly tailored to achieve that interest. Casey’s silence on the issue 
does not change this conclusion.
112
 Indeed, many lower courts 
addressing the issue of compelled ideological speech in commercial 
and professional contexts have concluded that such speech mandates 
must be analyzed using a heightened (though not always strict) level 
of scrutiny.
 113
  
 
Comm’n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1 (1986) (holding that a newsletter “receives the full protection of 
the First Amendment” where its contents “range from energy-saving tips to stories about 
wildlife conservation,” address “matters of public concern,” and “extend well beyond speech 
that proposes a business transaction”). 
 111. For a thoughtful analysis of both the normative and descriptive arguments in support 
of conclusion, see Keighley, supra note 12. 
 112. See, e.g., Stuart v. Camnitz, 774 F.3d 238, 249 (4th Cir. 2014), cert. denied sub nom. 
Walker-McGill v. Stuart, 135 S. Ct. 2838 (2015) (“The single paragraph in Casey does not 
assert that physicians forfeit their First Amendment rights in the procedures surrounding 
abortions, nor does it announce the proper level of scrutiny to be applied to abortion regulations 
that compel speech to the extraordinary extent present here.”). 
 113. See, e.g., Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, 806 F. Supp. 2d 
942 (W.D. Tex. 2011), vacated in part 667 F.3d 570 (5th Cir. 2012) (applying strict scrutiny to 
an abortion informed consent law that required physicians to “say things and take expressive 
actions with which the physician may not ideologically agree, and which the physician may feel 
are medically unnecessary,” because such speech was “inextricably intertwined with 
noncommercial speech”); Stuart v. Camnitz, 774 F.3d 238 (upholding district court’s use of 
Sorrell intermediate test for commercial speech, rather than strict scrutiny, for compulsions of 
ideological speech in the abortion context); Stuart v. Loomis, 992 F. Supp. 2d 585, 599–600 
(M.D.N.C.), aff’d sub nom. Stuart v. Camnitz, 774 F.3d 238, cert. denied sub nom. Walker-
McGill v. Stuart, 135 S. Ct. 2838 (recognizing that “the state’s express ideological interest” is 
relevant to the decision about the level of scrutiny to apply, ultimately applying heightened 
scrutiny as established by Sorrell to speech it described as “obviously not commercial” but 
requiring physicians to make statements “outside [the] prevailing practices” of medicine); 
CTIA–The Wireless Ass’n v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 827 F. Supp. 2d 1054, 1059 (N.D. 
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Given this doctrinal conclusion, however, there remains 
significant uncertainty as to what, precisely, qualifies as “ideological 
speech” for the purpose of the First Amendment.114 The application 
of strict scrutiny to compulsions of ideological speech originated in 
Wooley, where the Court held unconstitutional a New Hampshire law 
making it a crime to obscure the words “Live Free or Die” on state 
license plates.
115
 The Court described the law as one which “forces an 
individual, as part of his daily life . . . to be an instrument for 
fostering public adherence to an ideological point of view he finds 
unacceptable.”116 It held that the message communicated by the 
license plate was not “ideologically neutral” because it was intended 
by the state as being “an official view as to proper appreciation of 
history, state pride, and individualism.”117  
Lower courts have struggled with how to apply this precedent, 
particularly in the context of abortion informed consent laws. Just as 
courts have taken a variety of approaches in interpreting the “factual 
and uncontroversial” requirement, their interpretation of what counts 
as “ideological” speech likewise varies. The Fourth Circuit in Stuart 
v. Camnitz, for example, held that a North Carolina statute that 
requires physicians to perform an ultrasound, display the sonogram, 
and describe the fetus to women seeking abortions constitutes 
ideological speech prohibited under the First Amendment.
118
 In its 
opinion, the court wrote that although the words the physician must 
speak are “factual,” the context of the speech demonstrates the 
words’ “moral or ideological implications.”119 According to the court, 
the ultrasound requirement is intended to communicate “a particular 
 
Cal. 2011) (“Mandatory disclosures by businesses of government opinions and viewpoints 
. . . are subject to more exacting scrutiny.”). 
 114. See Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 496 U.S. 1, 14 (1990). 
 115. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 706–07 (1977) (holding that “where the State’s 
interest is to disseminate an ideology, no matter how acceptable to some, such interest cannot 
outweigh an individual’s First Amendment right to avoid becoming the courier for such 
message”). 
 116. Id. at 715. 
 117. Id. at 717. Cf. Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott, 521 U.S. 457, 469–70 (1997) 
(holding that assessments to pay for generic advertising for advertising of California nectarines, 
plums, and peaches “do not compel [fruit] produces to endorse or to finance any political or 
ideological views.”).  
 118. Stuart v. Camnitz, 774 F.3d at 242. 
 119. Id. at 246. 
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opinion,” and “explicitly promotes a pro-life message by demanding 
the provision of facts that all fall on one side of the abortion debate—
and does so shortly before the time of decision when the intended 
recipient is most vulnerable.”120 This holding seems consistent with 
Wooley’s concern about compelling someone to speak an “official 
view as to proper appreciation” of certain values. 
However, the Fifth Circuit, considering a similar ultrasound law, 
disagreed, focusing less on the context of the speech and more on the 
specific words used. In a footnote, the court noted that “ideological 
speech” as considered by Wooley is speech that “conveys a ‘point of 
view’” rather than communicates “factual information.”121 The 
ultrasound law, according to the court, did not satisfy this test. 
Though there may be questions at the margins, surely a 
photograph and description of its features constitute the purest 
conceivable expression of “factual information.” If the 
sonogram changes a woman's mind about whether to have an 
abortion. . . . that is a function of the combination of her new 
knowledge and her own “ideology” (“values” is a better term), 
not of any “ideology” inherent in the information she has 
learned about the fetus.
122
  
Unlike the Fourth Circuit, it analyzed the ideological nature of the 
statement solely by reference to the words stated, rather than the 
contextual understanding of those words. 
The Eighth Circuit in Rounds similarly rejected a First 
Amendment challenge to another abortion informed consent law that 
petitioners argued compelled ideological speech. The South Dakota 
law at issue required physicians to tell a patient seeking an abortion 
that “she has an existing relationship” with an unborn human being 
that “enjoys protection under the United States Constitution and 
under the laws of South Dakota” and that “by having an abortion, her 
existing relationship and her existing constitutional rights with 
 
 120. Id. 
 121. Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, 667 F.3d 570, 577 n.4 (5th 
Cir. 2012). 
 122. Id. 
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regards to that relationship will be terminated.”123 Planned 
Parenthood argued that this law compelled ideological speech 
because the speech carried inherent “moral and philosophical 
messages” that could be read to “make a point in the debate about the 
ethics of abortion.”124 The Eighth Circuit, however, did not explicitly 
address the First Amendment implications of Planned Parenthood’s 
claims about the ideological nature of the compelled speech; it 
merely concluded that the speech mandate did not violate Casey’s 
undue burden test.
125
 
Much like the question of what constitutes “factual and 
uncontroversial” speech, the question of what constitutes 
“ideological” speech is an open one. The greatest uncertainty arises 
when states require communication of factual information for 
ideological purposes, when the information presented is one-sided in 
order to emphasize the state’s preferred perspective, or when the 
factual information presented could reasonably be understood to have 
ideological implications or underpinnings. Courts addressing 
compelled speech challenges to informed consent laws will continue 
to struggle with this undetermined doctrine.  
FICTION: A PHYSICIAN’S ABILITY TO RESPOND TO, OR 
DISASSOCIATE HIMSELF FROM, COMPELLED GOVERNMENT 
SPEECH CAN SAVE AN OTHERWISE UNCONSTITUTIONAL SPEECH 
MANDATE. 
FACT: A PHYSICIAN’S ABILITY TO RESPOND TO, OR 
DISASSOCIATE HIMSELF FROM, COMPELLED GOVERNMENT 
SPEECH DOES NOT NEGATE OTHER CONSTITUTIONAL 
INFIRMITIES. 
OPEN QUESTION: DOES A PHYSICIAN’S INABILITY TO 
DISASSOCIATE HIMSELF FROM A COMPELLED GOVERNMENT 
 
 123. Planned Parenthood Minn. v. Rounds, 653 F.3d 662, 668 (8th Cir. 2011), vacated in 
part on reh’g en banc sub nom. by Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds, 662 F.3d 
1072 (8th Cir. 2011) and on reh’g en banc in part sub nom. by Planned Parenthood Minn., 
N.D., S.D. v. Rounds, 686 F.3d 889 (8th Cir. 2012). 
 124. Id. at 669. 
 125. Id. 
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MESSAGE RENDER AN OTHERWISE CONSTITUTIONAL SPEECH 
MANDATE UNCONSTITUTIONAL? 
Defenders of compelled speech mandates often argue that such 
mandates are not unconstitutional as long as the objecting speaker has 
an opportunity to disassociate from the compelled speech or issue his 
own response. In Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Utilities 
Commission of California, for example, the California Public Utilities 
Commission defended a rule requiring utility companies to include 
third-party newsletters in their billing envelopes by arguing that the 
third-party access requirement did not limit a utility’s speech or 
prohibit it from expressing its own message in response.
126
  
The appellants, however, argued that because the rule required 
them to provide access “only to those who disagree with [their] views 
and who are hostile to [their] interests,” it would necessarily embroil 
them in a “controversy” they would rather avoid by forcing them to 
respond to the third party’s hostile message.127 The Court agreed, 
holding that a utility’s ability to respond was not enough to protect 
the compelled speech law from First Amendment scrutiny.
128
 
“[T]here can be little doubt that appellant will feel compelled to 
respond to arguments and allegations made by [the third party],” the 
Court held, and such a “forced response is antithetical to the free 
discussion that the First Amendment seeks to foster.”129 It concluded 
that “the danger that appellant will be required to alter its own 
message as a consequence of the government's coercive action is a 
proper object of First Amendment solicitude,” and that strict scrutiny 
would therefore apply.
130
  
 
 126. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1, 4, 6 (1986). 
 127. Id. at 14. 
 128. Id. at 15–16. 
 129. Id. at 16 (“Were the government freely able to compel corporate speakers to propound 
political messages with which they disagree, this protection would be empty, for the 
government could require speakers to affirm in one breath that which they deny in the next.”). 
Cf. PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 88 (1980) (holding that shopping mall 
owners’ First Amendment rights were not violated in part because the views of the speakers on 
the owners’ property were not likely to be identified with those of the owner, and noting that 
the mall owners “are free to publicly disassociate themselves” from the views of speakers on 
their property). 
 130. Pacific Gas, 475 U.S. at 16.  
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The reasoning in Pacific Gas would likely apply equally in the 
context of physician speech mandates. If a state law compelling 
physicians to speak failed the Zauderer requirement of being purely 
factual and uncontroversial and rationally related to professional 
regulation, it could not be saved by the argument that physicians are 
permitted to disassociate themselves from or express disagreement 
with the message. Where a physician is required by law to 
communicate information with which he disagrees, he “may be 
forced either to appear to agree with [the compelled speech] or to 
respond,” even if he would prefer not to speak.131  
The Eighth Circuit in Rounds recognized this point in 2006 when 
it upheld a district court’s preliminary injunction against South 
Dakota’s abortion informed consent law,132 which required 
physicians to state that abortion “will terminate the life of a whole, 
separate, unique, living human being.”133 The state had defended this 
law on the grounds that physicians were permitted to “disassociate 
themselves” from the message if they found it objectionable.134 The 
court, however, concluded that the ability to disassociate oneself 
from an ideological message does not cure the constitutional 
infirmity, citing Pacific Gas for the proposition that “the injury which 
results from forcing an abortion provider to recite the state's 
ideological objections to abortion would not be eliminated by simply 
allowing her to add her own views.”135 This opinion was later 
vacated, however, and in 2008 the Eighth Circuit vacated the 
preliminary injunction on the grounds that the “human being” 
disclosure was a “truthful and non-misleading” statement.136 The 
court declined to reach a decision on whether and when the ability to 
 
 131. Id. See also Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott, 521 U.S. 457, 470–71 (1997) 
(citing Pacific Gas as standing for the proposition that the First Amendment prohibits forcing 
speakers “to respond to a hostile message when they ‘would prefer to remain silent’”). 
 132. Planned Parenthood Minn. v. Rounds, 467 F.3d 716, 725 (8th Cir. 2006), reh’g en 
banc granted, opinion vacated (8th Cir. 2007).  
 133. Id. at 719. 
 134. Id. at 725. 
 135. Id. The court noted, however, that the physician’s ability to disassociate himself from 
the state’s message might be constitutionally relevant if the mandated speech were not 
ideological—that is, if it were “generally neutral and accurate,” but “misleading as applied to a 
specific patient.” Id.  
 136. Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds, 530 F.3d 724, 736–37 (8th Cir. 
2008). 
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disassociate might constitutionally relevant, because it concluded that 
the South Dakota statute did not mandate any ideological speech 
from which disassociation was necessary.
137
 A dissenting opinion, 
however, restated the point made in the 2006 opinion, again citing 
Pacific Gas for the proposition that “[e]ven if the physician were able 
to disclaim sponsorship of the state's message, the constitutional 
defects inherent in compelled ideological speech would not be 
cured.”138 
The Second Circuit recognized this point as well in Evergreen, a 
constitutional challenge to crisis pregnancy center speech 
mandates.
139
 While compelling the speech of non-profit organizations 
rather than medical professionals, the court, citing Riley v. National 
Federation of the Blind of North Carolina, Inc., expressed concern 
that mandating disclosure of whether the centers provide abortion, 
emergency contraception, or prenatal care services “will change the 
way in which a pregnancy services center, if it so chooses, discusses 
[these controversial issues].”140 Because “[t]he centers must be free to 
formulate their own address,” the court found the disclosure 
unconstitutional.
141
 
Thus, a speaker’s ability to dissociate himself from a state-
mandated message by expressing disagreement with it will not save 
an otherwise unconstitutional statute. But what about the opposite 
scenario? Imagine a state informed consent law that satisfies all of 
the relevant constitutional tests described above—it compels 
 
 137. Id. at 737. In dicta, however, the court suggested that “the state could argue” that the 
ability to disassociate is constitutionally relevant when the compelled speech is ideological in 
nature. Id. at 736. 
 138. Id. at 746 (Murphy, J., dissenting). 
 139. Evergreen Ass’n, Inc. v. City of N.Y., 740 F.3d 233, 249-50 (2d Cir. 2014), cert. 
denied sub nom. Evergreen Ass’n, Inc. v. City of N.Y., N.Y., 135 S. Ct. 435 (2014), and 
Pregnancy Care Ctr. of N.Y. v. City of N.Y., N.Y., 135 S. Ct. 435 (2014). 
 140. Evergreen, 740 F.3d at 249–50; Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 
U.S. 781 (1988). As in Riley, the Second Circuit in Evergreen applied the strictest scrutiny to 
the New York speech mandate on the grounds that the crisis pregnancy centers were engaged in 
both commercial and non-commercial speech.  
 141. Evergreen, 740 F.3d at 249–50. Note that while the “Services Disclosure” appears to 
require disclosure of purely factual information (whether the center provides certain medical 
services), the Second Circuit ultimately interpreted the Services Disclosure as a “mandated 
discussion of controversial political topics.” Id. at 250. See supra text accompanying notes 65–
66. 
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physicians to communicate information that is rationally related to 
the practice of medicine, factual and uncontroversial, and non-
ideological. Could a physician nevertheless make the case that the 
law is unconstitutional if it is not clear that the physician’s speech is 
being controlled by the state? Numerous commentators have made 
this type of argument, claiming that additional constitutional 
concerns arise when the state “commandeers”142 physicians to act as 
“mouthpieces”143 or “puppets”144 for the state’s message.145  
There is indeed something in the Supreme Court’s First 
Amendment jurisprudence to support the point that listeners’ 
confusion about the source of speech may implicate its 
constitutionality. In many compelled speech cases, the Court has 
carefully analyzed whether the speech is likely to be perceived by 
listeners as being controlled by the speaker, as opposed to by the state 
or a third party. In Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian, and 
Bisexual Group of Boston, for example, a group of LGBT individuals 
of Irish descent brought suit against the organizers of a St. Patrick’s 
Day parade who refused to let them march.
146
 In analyzing whether 
the requiring the organizers to include the LGBT group would violate 
the organizers’ First Amendment rights, the Court considered the 
difference between speakers who are viewed as “conduits” for the 
speech of others, and those who are viewed as autonomous speakers 
themselves.
147
 It noted that the LGBT group’s participation in the 
parade “would likely be perceived as having resulted from [the 
organizers’] determination . . . that its message was worthy of 
 
 142. Keighley, supra note 12, at 2381. 
 143. Gregory D. Curfman et al., Physicians and the First Amendment, 359 NEW ENG. J. 
MED. 2484 (2008). 
 144. Robbins, supra note 48. 
 145. Haupt, supra note 12, at 1257 (arguing that constitutional norms may be violated 
when a state “demands that physicians communicate certain claims to their patients in materials 
of [their] own design [to] effectively tr[y] to obscure authorship even though it is the state that 
retains effective control over the content of the message.”); Helen Norton, The Measure of 
Government Speech: Identifying Expression’s Source, 88 B.U. L. REV. 587 (2008) [hereinafter 
Norton, The Measure of Government Speech] (in the context of government speech doctrine, 
noting the constitutional importance of establishing, both formally and functionally, when 
speech is coming from the state or a third party). 
 146. Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557 (1995). 
 147. Id. at 575–77. 
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presentation and quite possibly of support as well.”148 The Court 
contrasted this with speakers like cable broadcasters and shopping 
mall owners who, despite acting as hosts for third-party speech, likely 
would not be perceived as supporting those third-party messages.
149
 It 
concluded that where “a speaker intimately connected with the 
communication advanced” is compelled to speak, where the 
communication is “perceived by” listeners to be part of a speaker’s 
message or otherwise identified with the speaker, “the speaker's right 
to autonomy over the message is compromised.”150 Two years later, 
in Glickman v. Wileman Brothers & Elliott, the Supreme Court 
reaffirmed this idea, summarizing its prior compelled speech 
jurisprudence as holding that constitutional concerns arise when the 
state requires speakers to “repeat an objectionable message out of 
their own mouths . . . use their own property to convey an 
antagonistic ideological message . . . force them to respond to a 
hostile message when they ‘would prefer to remain silent’ . . . or 
require them to be publicly identified or associated with another’s 
message.”151  
Where informed consent mandates require physicians to 
communicate messages dictated by the state, there is a substantial 
risk that patient-listeners will not recognize the true origins of the 
speech.
152
 As recognized by a dissenting opinion in Rounds, 
communications by physicians to patients “are, if anything, more 
likely to be attributed to the speaker than the well known slogan 
affixed to a state issued license plate in Wooley or the forced 
publication of third party speech in Pacific Gas,” because the context 
in which the statements are made is one “in which patients expect 
doctors to use their best and honest judgment.”153 Robert Post notes 
that compelled commercial speech such as government-mandated 
 
 148. Id. at 575 (analogizing to newspapers with editorial control, and the utilities in Pacific 
Gas). 
 149. Id. at 576–77. 
 150. Id. at 576–80. 
 151. Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott, 521 U.S. 457, 470–71 (1997). 
 152. Note, however, that some informed consent mandates clearly identify the source of the 
disclosed information, as in the case of laws requiring physicians to direct patients seeking 
abortions to state brochures or state websites for additional information. 
 153. Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds, 530 F.3d 724, 747 (Murphy, J., 
dissenting). 
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labels and reports generally “do . . . not pose a problem of stealth or 
ventriloquism,” because it is obvious to consumers that the disclosure 
is coming from the state.
154
 But when patients discuss the risks and 
benefits of proposed medical procedures with their physicians as part 
of the informed consent process, they are relying on their physicians’ 
medical expertise and do not anticipate that the statements their 
physicians are communicating are not the physicians’ own. 
Moreover, unlike in cases such as Hurley, PruneYard, Rumsfeld, and 
others, the objectionable message is being communicated directly by 
the physician-speaker, rather than the physician simply offering a 
forum for others to speak. Indeed, anecdotal evidence supports the 
fact that many health care providers subject to objectionable 
informed consent laws take great pains to disassociate themselves 
from state-mandated messages.
155
 
Lack of clarity about the source of the message is problematic, in 
part, because it may lead patients to overestimate the persuasiveness 
and credibility of the message.
156
 “Because health professionals may 
be seen as more credible than the government in this setting based on 
public perception of their expertise and objectivity, patients may have 
 
 154. Post, Compelled Commercial Speech, supra note 39, at 918. 
 155. One pre-abortion ultrasound informed consent form from a Texas physician, currently 
circulating on various internet forums, includes the following language: 
The Texas legislature, in its infinite wisdom, believes that neither you nor I are 
intelligent enough to carry on a conversation about how you might make an informed 
decision about how best to handle your current pregnancy. To be sure that they and 
their ideologues are part of our doctor patient relationship, they have mandated that 
you be forced to see and hear the ultrasound of your pregnancy, as well as be given a 
detailed description of the pregnancy’s development to this stage. By inserting 
themselves into our conversation, they have almost certainly violated our first 
amendment rights to free speech and intruded into the time-honored relationship you 
and I share at this critical time in our lives. It is, however, the current state law in 
Texas. 
Cory Doctorow, Texas Doctor’s Consent Form for Women Seeking Abortions, 
BOINGBOING.NET (Aug. 28, 2015), https://boingboing.net/2015/08/28/texas-doctors-consent-
form-f.html?fk_bb. 
 156. Norton, The Measure of Government Speech, supra note 145, at 595–97 (citing Gia 
Lee and Lawrence Lessig’s research, noting that messages that appear to be influenced by the 
government or other powerful groups may be less effective than those communicated by actors 
perceived to be more independent); Corbin, supra note 73, at 1329 (“To start, confusion about 
who is speaking could cause the listener to overestimate the popularity of the government’s 
message, thereby increasing its persuasiveness. In addition, the distortion may be magnified due 
to the tendency to defer to respected authority figures such as doctors.”). 
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been misled into evaluating the counseling differently than they 
would have if the speakers had made clear the governmental 
source.”157 Indeed, governments may choose to communicate their 
messages by way of private or professional speakers with the clear 
goal of taking advantage of the speakers’ perceived independence.158 
Thus, the analysis might be different in cases where the source of 
the physician-communicated message is made obvious, or where the 
message is not communicated directly by the physician as speaker—
for example, where a physician is merely required to present the 
patient with a state brochure, or direct the patient to a state website.
159
 
Informed consent mandates that include obvious statements or other 
cues informing the patient that the information communicated is 
required by law and may not represent the physician’s professional 
perspective are likely to be seen as preferable.
160
 
However, even messages that are clearly identified as state-
sponsored may be problematic when compelled in the specific 
context of medical care. Many commentators have argued that the 
intervention of a government message into a sphere that patients 
expect to be a locus of professional independence may jeopardize the 
trust inherent in the physician-patient relationship.
161
 Robert Post 
discusses this concern in the context of subsidized speech, noting that 
while the state can traditionally compel viewpoint-based speech in 
managerial domains, the physician’s professional “obligation to make 
independent medical judgments sets limits to the managerial 
authority” of an employer who seeks to control the physician’s 
speech.
162
 Under most circumstances, he writes, “patients expect the 
independent judgment of their physicians to trump inconsistent 
 
 157. Norton, The Measure of Government Speech, supra note 145, at 629–30. 
 158. Id. at 595–96. 
 159. See Keighley, supra note 12, at 2377 (“A law that requires a physician to offer a state 
pamphlet to her patients does not infringe the physician’s constitutionally protected autonomy 
interests because the physician herself is not required to adopt the state’s ideological views, nor 
to represent these views as her own.”). 
 160. See Norton, The Measure of Government Speech, supra note 145, at 630–31 
(discussing express cues for disassociation with a state-mandated message). 
 161. See, e.g., Robbins, supra note 48, at 192–93; Corbin, supra note 73, at 1329–30; Zick, 
supra note 10, at 1353, 1355.  
 162. Robert C. Post, Subsidized Speech, 106 YALE L.J. 151, 171–74 (1996). 
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managerial demands.”163 Thus, even if a physician’s state-mandated 
message is prefaced by a disclaimer about the source of the message, 
such a disclaimer may, due the unique nature of the physician-patient 
relationship, be inadequate to fully disassociate the physician from 
the compelled speech in the patient’s eyes. 
Thus, one could make the argument that state laws that rely on 
physicians as mouthpieces for the state’s messages (even if those 
messages are determined by a court to be factual and uncontroversial) 
violate the First Amendment. However, there are two reasons why it 
is unlikely that courts will adopt this line of reasoning. First, it is 
doubtful that most courts would agree with the factual conclusion that 
patients always consider physician speech to be the physician’s own 
medical judgments, even if that speech is prefaced with a disclaimer 
or clearly identified as state-mandated.
164
 Second, as a policy matter, 
accepting this argument would broaden the scope of physicians’ First 
Amendment protection quite dramatically. If a physician’s inability 
to disassociate himself from state-mandated messages renders those 
messages potentially unconstitutional, then even factual and 
uncontroversial informed consent mandates would be at risk. 
CONCLUSION 
Most state informed consent laws are uncontroversial. Physicians 
understand the necessity of providing patients with factual 
information about their medical options. But when state legislatures 
establish disclosure mandates that go beyond the common law 
requirements of informed consent, that require disclosure of 
inaccurate or one-sided information, or that mandate or prohibit 
speech on controversial topics, physicians will object. Unfortunately, 
because the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on compelled 
professional speech is so limited, litigants have struggled to piece 
together convincing constitutional arguments from commercial 
 
 163. Id. at 174. 
 164. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 200 (1991) (in the limited context of physicians 
practicing within Title X facilities, noting that “a doctor’s silence with regard to abortion cannot 
reasonably be thought to mislead a client into thinking that the doctor does not consider 
abortion an appropriate option for her”). 
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speech contexts, Fourteenth Amendment contexts, and every area in 
between.  
While it is impossible to predict how the Supreme Court might 
rule in a modern compelled physician speech case, this Article offers 
a tentative framework by which the Court might analyze such a case 
based on past rulings. In order to pass constitutional muster, a state 
law compelling physician speech would have to be reasonably related 
to the regulation of the medical profession and would have to compel 
factual, uncontroversial, and non-ideological speech (although the 
definitions of those terms are clearly ambiguous and offer much room 
for interpretation). If the state speech mandate intersects with a 
patient’s Fourteenth Amendment rights to medical self-determination 
or reproductive privacy, additional requirements will apply. And 
finally, it is possible—though unlikely, given how broadly this would 
expand physicians’ First Amendment protections—that the Court 
might consider even otherwise-permissible speech mandates 
unconstitutional if patients are unable to distinguish between their 
physicians’ own messages and the messages that are mandated by 
law. 
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